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altered by the distinction between natural or manmade water flow. The
Texas Water Code authorized a commission to issue permits for discharges
into state waters if the applicant can show feasibility of the proposed
amount of discharge from the treatment facility, and that the discharge will
not lower the quality of the stream water. In this case, the requirements
were met, thus a taking did not exist.
Tiffany Turner

Freeman v. Cherokee Water Co., 11 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
appellees on appellant's counterclaims based on the preclusion of the
claims by res judicata and statute of limitations).
In 1948, the Freemans' parents settled a condemnation proceeding with
Cherokee Water Company ("Cherokee") by conveying the title of tract of
land to them. Prior to the settlement, Cherokee sought condemnation of
the land in order to construct a reservoir to supply water to the surrounding
community and to produce electricity for the community's use. Following
the settlement, Cherokee constructed this reservoir, and later built a
residential development on the acquired property as well. As part of the
settlement with Cherokee, the Freemans' parents inserted a provision in the
deed to the land allowing them and their children to fish at the reservoir.
When their parents died, a dispute arose between the Freemans and
Cherokee as to whether these fishing rights survived the death of the
grantors. Cherokee instituted a declaratory judgment action asking the
court to construe the fishing rights provision. In response, the Freemans
entered counterclaims against Cherokee alleging fraud and violations of the
doctrine of eminent domain by Cherokee.
Cherokee filed a motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims
stating that the claims were barred as a matter of law by both the statute of
At trial, the court severed the
limitations and by res judicata.
counterclaims from the issue of the fishing rights and then granted
Cherokee's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims.
The Freemans appealed the decision of the trial court arguing that: (1)
evidence produced at trial showed that contrary to the law of eminent
domain, Cherokee used the land for private rather than public purposes; (2)
the statute of limitations should not have barred their counterclaims since
the claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence in dispute in
Cherokee's declaratory judgment action; and (3) the counterclaims involve
different matters than those decided in the 1948 condemnation suit and
therefore were not prohibited by res judicata.
The appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed the grant of
summary judgment issued by the trial court on all of the Freemans'
counterclaims. In so doing, the court held that: (1) the counterclaims did
not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that formed the basis of
Cherokee's declaratory judgment action; (2) the issues raised by the
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Freemans should have been addressed in the -1948 condemnation
proceeding; and (3) the private purposes for which the land in dispute was
being used by Cherokee was merely ancillary to the public purposes which
it served.
Although a claim may be barred as a separate action because the statute
of limitations has run on the claim, such a claim may be brought as a
counterclaim if it has a logical relationship to the dispute raised in the
original dispute. The Freemans contended that their counterclaims related
to Cherokee's declaratory judgment action in that both related to the deed
to the land in dispute. The court rejected this assertion. It held that while
the declaratory judgment action sought an interpretation of a single
provision of the deed, the Freemans' counterclaims questioned the validity
of the deed itself. In the eyes of the court, the two actions did not bear a
relationship to each other sufficient to defeat the statute of limitations.
The doctrine of res judicata prevents a claimant from litigating
allegations that have been adjudicated in a prior action, or could have been,
but were not litigated in a prior action. If a party was in privity with a
claimant from the original action, they also will be barred from bringing
such claims. Privity prevents claims from being litigated by parties who
were not parties to the original action but possess an interest in the basic
legal right that was the subject of the subsequent action. Alluding to these
principles, the court held that the Freemans were barred from asserting
claims of fraud against Cherokee because their parents, with whom the
Freemans were in privity, could have raised such challenges in the 1948
condemnation proceeding. The court based this decision on the fact that
the Freemans made assertions that Cherokee engaged in the fraudulent
taking of the land. At the time of the taking, the Freemans' parents,
interested parties, had an appropriate forum available to them in which to
assert a claim of fraud.
The court also found summary judgment proper in regard to the
Freemans' claim of wrongful acquisition by eminent domain. The rule of
eminent domain allowed for the procurement of private land for public use
by persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions that are public
in nature. The Freemans contended that because Cherokee put the land to
private use by selling off lots on the property to be used as residential
housing, Cherokee violated the law of eminent domain. The court,
however, interpreted the law more loosely, and held that there was no such
violation because this use was secondary to the public function for which
Cherokee used the land.
Jason Wells

